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Katia Hristova 
I. Introduction 
The collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern European countries in the late 
1980's led the countries into a drastic political, social and economic transformation. The 
fundamental economic restructuring consisted of three main processes: macroeconomic 
stabilization, market liberalization and privatization. A vital part of this triad, 
privatization, was expected to restructure the ownership patterns held for the past 50 
years, create a social class of entrepreneurs and, thus, change the manner of operation of 
enterprises and achieve greater economic efficiency (Eggertson, 1997). 
Voucher privatization, a kind of large-scale privatization, was of special 
importance. It was conducted by the Czech Government in order to redistribute property 
among the population in a situation of complete lack of domestic private capital. All 
citizens over the age of 18 had the opportunity to obtain a voucher book. However, by 
providing little information about the process, the Government was really aiming only at 
the knowledgeable citizens who would be successful entrepreneurs. Voucher 
privatization was also thought of as a way to speed up the transition in the economy. 
In my study, I plan to analyze voucher privatization in the Czech Republic. This 
process is best characterized as decision making under both risk and uncertainty, where 
the thousands of individuals who initially received vouchers were operating under near 
total uncertainty while larger institutional investors who later seized control of the 
vouchers were operating under conditions of risk. I will analyze the resulting patterns of 
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ownership in comparison to the goals of the process. I will also discuss the role of the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank as institutions which affect the conditions 
under which voucher privatization was conducted. In particular, I will explore how the 
situation of asymmetric information in the privatization process led to the establishment 
of institutions and the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few individuals who 
have neither the skill nor the incentives to initiate change in the enterprises (Fullerton, 
1998. Nellis, 1999). 
II. Background information on voucher privatization in the Czech Republic 
Three kinds ofprivatization were used in the Czech Republic - small-scale 
privatization, large-scale privatization, and restitution. Small-scale privatization targets 
smaller companies, while large-scale privatization focuses on transferring ownership of 
large enterprises and corporations. In addition, a distinction is made between classical 
and voucher-style privatization. The classical methods, often called the standard methods, 
are auctions, direct sales and tenders. The voucher-style is a non-classical approach that 
uses coupons instead of currency. The large-scale voucher privatization is the one this 
paper will be discussing (Schmidt and Schneitzer, 1997). 
The legal basis of large-scale privatization is the Large Privatization Act of 1991. 
It states as possible methods for major privatization, direct sale to "assigned owner" (i.e. 
without tender), a tender, an auction, a free transfer of shares to local authority, pension 
fund or health insurance fund, sale of shares on the capital market and voucher 
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privatization (Nemcova, 1998). Most enterprises were privatised by use of a combination 
of several of these. 
The preparatory period for large-scale privatization started in the autumn of 1991 
and finished at the beginning of 1992. It involved privatization project submission and 
approval. The managers of all state-owned enterprises, which were to be privatised, were 
obliged to create a proposal that included a full description and evaluation of the firm and 
their suggestion for its future privatization. All physical and legal bodies interested could 
also submit a proposal for the privatization of an SOE (state owned enterprise) or a part 
of it. The Ministry of Administration ofNational Property and its Privatization1 reviewed 
the privatization projects for every company and decided on which ones to implement. 
The National Property Fund2, a public body established by the Government and 
subordinate to and supervised by the MANPP (The Ministry ofNational Property and 
Privatization), was then responsible for materialising the approved projects. 
Voucher privatization was conducted in order to redistribute property among the ' 
Czech population in a situation of lack of domestic capital. The process is described in 
the Scenario of the Economic Reforms (1989) as "the one and only possibility ofhow to 
involve the broadest section of the population in the process of major privatization within 
a relatively briefperiod oftime." (Czech Government, Scenario of the Economic 
Reforms) Voucher privatization is "a process in which a substantial portion of an 
economy's public assets is quickly transferred to a large, diverse group of private buyers" 
(Mejstrik, 1997). The process is described in detail in Appendix A. 
1 Further information on the Ministry of National Property and its Privatization can be found at
 
<http://www.psp.cz/info/govemment.html>
 
2 For more information on the National property Fund and its activities see
 
<http://www.pvtnet.cz/iso/www/ri£.>
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-There were 1,664 companies that had some or all of their assets included in 
voucher privatization. Voucher privatization took place in two waves, which involved, 
respectively, five and six rounds. The first wave involved shares in 988 firms. The second 
included shares in an additional 676 firms plus unsold shares in 185 firms carried over 
from the first wave. The total book value of the equity privatised through vouchers was 
more than $14 billion, about 10 per cent of the Czech Republic's national wealth. 
All Czech citizens of the age of 18 and older had the opportunity to buy a 
privatization coupon. Approximately 75 percent of eligible Czechs participated in each 
wave, making the book value of the shares available slightly more than $1,400 per 
participant in the first wave and $1,000 in the second wave. 
In the first wave 72.2 percent ofparticipants turned their vouchers over to one of 
the IPFs. In the second wave a somewhat smaller 63.5 percent of participants assigned 
their points to one of the funds. In addition to those who assigned their points to the 
funds, between 1.5 and 2 million individuals bid their points themselves.3 
III. Conceptual Framework of Czech Voucher Privatization 
By deciding to conduct voucher privatization the Czech Government was 
attempting to set up a process in which the country's citizens have the opportunity to 
acquire ownership and control of former state property. The more knowledgeable 
voucher holders have a better chance of accomplishing this. Those with knowledge are 
more likely able to assess the probability of success ofvarious enterprises and thus 
acquire ownership rights in companies that will produce capital gains for them. This 
3 For statistics on Czech voucher privatization see http://www.freedomhouse.org/nit98/czech.html and 
<http://src-home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/engicee/czech-e.html> 
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gives the Government a better chance of achieving its goal - creating a successful and 
competitive private sector in the Czech economy. Performing a kind ofnatural selection 
among Czech citizens was supposed to eventually create a capitalist society in which the 
economy is run by the people who have the necessary skills and knowledge. 
The following sections describe how the Government of the Czech Republic and 
the IMF are the "rule setters" for the process. The participants in voucher privatization 
are those who have the opportunity to acquire vouchers. The early participants in the 
process were individual Czech citizens. Later the players were Investment Privatization 
Funds - a newly created institution. IPFs were registered as limited liability companies 
that issue of shares of stock against the reception of investment vouchers and 
subsequently used these vouchers to purchase shares in SOE's. Only a few of the IPFs 
were successful and came to dominate ownership and control of the privatized assets. 
The Role of the IMF: 
The IMF's influence on the privatization process in the Czech Republic was 
significant and ranged from advice to actual agreements. At the urging of the IMF, the 
process was completed fast, without the necessary legal and institutional framework in 
place. 
The International Monetary Fund (specifically the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) and the World Bank have both attempted to help the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe during their economic transformation. In the 
words ofMichael Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF, "Helping these 
countries to reorient their economies toward market-based systems... has been one ofthe 
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Fund's greatest challenges in its 50-year history." (Camdessus, 1994) The IMF has 
openly encouraged shock therapy. The words if Michel Camdessus demonstrate this: 
First, and most important, the most appropriate course of action is to adopt a bold 
strategy. Many countries... have by now proven the feasibility of implementing 
policies of rapid - and I stress rapid - ... structural reform... What can be said 
about "gradualism"? The fact of the matter is that gradualism has not been found 
to be an effective presumption in any ofthe three major policy areas. (3) 
Moreover, it seems that quick structural reform has been a condition for receiving 
the financial assistance of the IMF: 
While all the forms of cooperation have proven essential, I would emphasize how 
external financing has followed the commitment to and implementation of 
appropriate policies. (Camdessus, 15) 
A detailed description of the IMF's view on the transformation in the Czech and 
Slovak Republics can be found in the publication by Bijan B. Aghive1i, Eduardo 
Borensztein, and Tessa van der Willingen (1992), as well as in the annual publication of 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development also analyses the Czech transformation 
(2002). 
The Participants in the Voucher Privatization Process 
There are three primary participants: Investment Privatization Funds established 
by banks, IPFs established by individuals, and the original voucher holders. 
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The Individual Voucher Holders 
The voucher holders, the ones who were meant to participate in the process set up 
by the Government and IMF were intended to ultimately gain control and ownership of 
the private sector in the economy. Unfortunately, this did not happen. 
The discrepancy in the demand for vouchers expected by the Government and the 
actual public demand is significant. It was expected that about 30% of all eligible citizens 
would participate in voucher privatisation. Instead, this figure turned to 75%. The 
primary reason for this was the clever and massive advertisement campaign of IPFs. The 
IPFs were successful in making the purchase ofvouchers seem even more attractive by 
making attractive offers ofbuying out people's shares for 10,000 CZK (about $250), thus 
giving them a profit of almost 9,000 CZK (about $225), were successful in making the 
purchase of investment coupons seem even more attractive. Also, the sale of the vouchers 
to IPFs seemed to be the only reasonable opportunity to make profit for the voucher 
holders. Most ofthem, therefore, purchased vouchers and then quickly sold those 
vouchers to IPFs so that they could realize a quick profit and not have to deal with the 
uncertainty of investing the vouchers by themselves. The process, as setup by the 
Government and IMF, turned into a missed opportunity for them, because of the new 
participants and the information asymmetry among participants, discussed in the 
following sections. 
The IPFs 
New participants, unforeseen by the rule setters became part ofthe game. The 
legal deficiency, which combined with the information asymmetry, was compensated for 
7 
-through the emergence of an institution - IPFs. Two types of IPFs emerged, each with 
very different objectives: IPFs established by banks, and IPFs established by individuals. 
Most of the shares are still owned and managed by Investment Privatisation 
Funds. These institutions are mostly owned by Czech Banks. Ofthese, the "Big Four" ­
Komercni Banka, Ceska Sporite1na, CSOB, Investicni a Postovni Banka (Mejstrik, 1997) 
together with the Czech Insurance Company own the vast majority of the established 
shares. Surprisingly, the controlling shareholder in these five largest financial institutions 
is the National Property Fund, which is controlled by the state. This situation of state 
control over a large amount of the privatised property questions the entire success of the 
voucher scheme. A spider web of confusion is created around the control of the shares 
owned by the big four banks and the insurance companies, since they each bought 
controlling shares in the other four. 
Other IPFs were established by individuals. The biggest one of this group is The 
Harvard Capital and Consultings, established by Viktor Kouzeny - a graduate of the 
Harvard Economics department and a Czech citizen. The Harvard Funds was the first 
IPF to advertise in the media, and they ended up as the third largest IPF. They acquired a 
total of931 million vouchers, which amounts to over 11% of coupon books available. 
Again, the situation became more complicated when the Harvard Capital and Consultings 
initiated a joint venture with Stratton Investments, a company also initiated by Viktor 
Kouzeny. Controlling stakes ofCzech companies were transferred to Stratton 
Investments. It was quickly realised what had happened - voucher privatisation had been 
used as a way of acquiring ownership and control of a significant part of the Czech 
economy by one individual. 
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Looking at the process of voucher privatisation in retrospect, the new owners are 
not the ones the Government planned for. The new efficiency and governance of firms 
did not come fast (or not at all in some cases), and the plan for a socially fair way of 
privatization seems to have turned into a "give-away" of assets. A crude and far from 
perfect estimate ofthe amount of money that the voucher holder received from IPFs is 
about $750,000,000. This estimate assumes that IPFs paid about 5 million voucher 
holders about $150 dollars per voucher. Admittedly, this is a crude estimate, but it does 
illustrate the point that the amount paid is far less than the cost of the over 1600 
enterprises sold in the process. The Czech citizens suffered from the pressure of the IPFs 
and were deprived of the equal and fair opportunity the Government promised and tried 
to provide. Very few individuals are now profiting investors by themselves with an active 
role in controlling units of production in the economy. Largely disappointed with the 
process, they found their vouchers taken over by bigger and more informed IPFs, which' 
later reregistered as holdings. This added another unfulfilled pre-election promise to the 
list. The IPFs, probably caused more confusion than they expected and distorted a 
substantial part ofthe Czech transformation. In this process the IPFs made a large profit. 
Carrying their agenda through, they are now well-functioning holdings, owned by 
millionaires - the new owners of a big part of Czech economic assets. 
The establishment ofthe IPFs and the resulting ownership patterns described can 
be understood in the context of decision making under risk and uncertainty theories. I 
present these in the following section. 
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Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty 
Many choices that economic agents make involve considerable uncertainty, which 
has a serious impact on economic relations. Frank Knight (1938), in his book entitled 
"Risk, Uncertainty and Profits" makes a distinction between "risk" and "uncertainty". He 
sees risk in situations where the decision-maker can assign probabilities to the 
randomness, which he is facing. On the other hand, he defines as uncertain situations in 
which this randomness cannot be expressed in terms ofmathematical probabilities. 
Knight's theory of uncertainty is also supported by Keynes, who says: 
By 'uncertain' knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish 
what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not 
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty... The sense in which I am using the term is 
that in which there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. (22) 
In a situation of uncertainty (randomness with unknowable possibilities), the 
knowledge assumption which states that all economic agents possess full and symmetric 
information, is not fulfilled. Thus, a major prerequisite for perfect competition is missing. 
Lacking any understanding of which decisions are likely to lead to a desired outcome, 
economic agents still have to make decisions. These decisions, according the Knight, will 
lead to unexpected economic outcomes. Observations can be made that contradict 
economic theory, because economic theory is constructed on the basis of competition and 
some estimate of the expected outcomes of decisions. 
10 
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Risk, on the other hand is defined as randomness with knowable probabilities. 
The riskiness of alternative choices can be compared, as well as the probability of each 
possible outcome. Various measures of risk have been developed. According to people's 
preferences towards risk, they can take decisions choosing the amount of risk they are 
willing to bear. 
In addition, Thomas Sowell in his book Knowledge and Decisions (1980) writes 
about uncertainty and the cost ofknowledge. According to his theory, the "most basic 
economic decision is who shall decide." Different economic agents that can take a 
decision may have varying quality, quantity and cost ofknowledge. The high personal 
cost of acquiring expertise in an area would be an incentive to hand the decision over to 
an institution that has acquired the expertise. In any situation where some economic 
agents lack information and it is costly or difficult to acquire it, an institution with better 
or more knowledge is likely to arise spontaneously and make a profit from the 
uncertainty the other economic agents are facing. However, Sowell believes that the 
institution is not responsible for this outcome - it is just the messenger conveying the bad 
news - information is not being transmitted equally. 
Privatization funds in the Czech Republic appeared as a new institution because 
of an information gap, as explained by Sowell's theory. The voucher holders lacked 
knowledge and it was too costly for them, if at all possible, to acquire it. After the IPFs 
started to function, the Czech voucher owners were in fact facing uncertainty about the 
outcomes of their possible investments. The Czech Voucher Privatization Funds, on the 
other hand, are facing potential risk. The distinction between risk and uncertainty here is 
used as described in the theoretical section. 
11 
-Thus, there is a situation of asymmetric infonnation, in which sellers (the original 
voucher holders) are forced to make an uninfonned decisions and,buyers (the IPFs) have 
the opportunity to make an economic profit. 
v. Empirical model- Czech buyers and sellers of vouchers under uncertainty 
One of the goals ofvoucher privatisation was to perfonn a kind ofnatural 
selection among Czech citizens. This was supposed to eventually create a society in 
which the economy is run by the "best" and the production units are in the hands of 
people who have the skills to make them successful. Creating a capitalist society from 
scratch could have benefited a lot from such an idea. By giving little infonnation about 
the process and conducting an intentionally poor advertising campaign, the Czech 
government was creating an equal, but not egalitarian opportunity for entrepreneurship--a 
situation in which only the educated, knowledgeable citizens would own investment 
coupons, since they are the only ones who would know how to manage them and benefit 
from the process. This, however, created an infonnation deficiency which was 
compensated for through the emergence of IPFs. The discrepancy in the demand for 
vouchers expected by the Government and the actual public demand illustrates this. It 
was expected that about 30% of all eligible citizens would participate in voucher 
privatisation. Instead, this figure turned to 75%. The clever and massive advertisement 
campaign ofIPFs, combined with attractive offers ofbuying out people's shares for 
10,000 CZK, thus giving them a profit of almost 9,000 CZK, were successful in making 
the purchase of investment coupons seem even more attractive. 
12 
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Looking at the founders of the IPFs it is obvious that they were the agents who 
had a definite advantage in tenns of infonnation. Domestic banks had a distinct 
infonnation edge over the Czech population, based upon both long-established credit ties 
with the enterprise sector, as well as good connections to the relevant public authorities 
since the majority of banks are still owned by the state. 
The infonnation available to citizens was also not equal and enabled some like 
Viktor Kouzheni (Harvard Capital) to establish IPFs. Certain citizens had insider 
infonnation about companies, which others weren't able to use. The infonnation provided 
for all participants in voucher privatisation by the Government was intentionally 
insufficient. Consequently, the people who only relied on this and had no other means of 
obtaining infonnation were left in an unfair position. Apart from making voucher 
privatisation somewhat non-transparent and putting its fairness under doubt, this 
facilitated the creation of the IPF as an institution (Hingorani, 1997). 
IPFs are institutions that make decisions on behalf of a large number of small 
investors. The public profits from them because acquiring the infonnation is too 
expensive for people to acquire and they prefer to have somebody make the decision for 
them. IPFs also profitted. This is easily seen if we look at the main founders ofIPFs. The 
different founders ofIPFs saw different incentives to create the funds. Looking at banks 
and individuals, we see their motivation and how the infonnation gap between them and 
the Czech voucher holders created a different incentive structure and outlined their 
actions. 
13 
1. IPFs established by banks 
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The emergence ofbank-established IPFs can be regarded as a spontaneous 
institutional arrangement in a situation of insufficient information. As the state was 
gradually withdrawing from the economy, lending decisions had to be taken by bank 
personnel, not ordered by the Government and executed. In order .to make corporate 
lending by banks effective, banks had to develop ways to determine different levels of 
risk associated with different clients or projects. An information asymmetry between 
banks and enterprises existed, since the information about enterprises was never available 
to banks during the communist period and could not become easily available during the 
process ofcreating active new owners of firms. Banks that established IPFs and bought 
shares in different companies made significant progress in terms of information because 
they could then place representatives on the boards ofdirectors. Having bank staff 
serving on the boards of directors of firms, provided continuous bank monitoring of the 
enterprises and resulted in a decrease of the information asymmetry. This led to more 
efficient portfolio evaluation. In addition, the dual role ofbanks as shareholders and 
lenders facilitated the informal workout procedures ofproblematic loans. 
The investment strategy of IPFs established by banks, also demonstrates that the 
banks' goal was to obtain insider information about enterprises, which would be helpful 
in making lending decisions. They spread their portfolios evenly among industries. No 
sectoral specialization or concentration is observed. Banks opted for very diversified 
portfolios that would allow them to have a member on the board ofdirectors of a wide 
range of enterprises. Most bank established IPFs bought shares in over 500 different 
14 
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enterprises (Mejstrik, 1997). This gives useful infonnation that is extremely relevant to 
lending decisions. 
2. IPFs established by individuals 
Individual IPF founders also saw an infonnation gap that would let them profit. 
This created an enterpreneural kind ofIPF. The biggest one of those, Harvard Capital and 
Consulting (HCC), had the most concentrated portfolio of all IPFs. HCC tried to 
maximize their stakes in companies with a strong starting position in their industry and 
placed their entire portfolio in monopolistic supply structures. They invested more than 
70% of their investment points in the energy sector and the financial sector. Both are 
highly concentrated and key sectors for the Czech economy. As the HCC's founder 
stated, HCC "favored investments that had a predominant position in the market due to 
their role in the fonner command economy." (Schuette, 2000) 
The banking and energy sectors are highly concentrated sectors. At the time of 
voucher privatization they had high market shares and were in very good condition. 
Considering their positions as monopolies and oligopolies, they were comparatively safe 
investments in industries with guaranteed returns. These are industries immune to market 
risks, such as changing consumer preferences or enhanced competition from other finns 
in the industry. Uncertainties are linked to political risk such as lack ofknowledge about 
future regulatory environment. The biggest electricity producer in the country - CEZ 
(Czech Power Company) is running the country's largest existing nuclear power plant 
and has a leading part in the new plant in Temelin in South Bohemia. The liabilities 
15 
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resulting from two such gigantic projects are difficult to assess and bear by any outsider. 
The major IPFs are in a better position to take the risk related to significant investments. 
In the words of Schuette, "from a long-term perspective, substantial holdings in the 
energy sector may be a good base to acquire control over the companies with a dominant 
market position in the future when the state will withdraw from th,e industry." (Schuette, 
2000) 
In addition, it is obvious that HCC's goal in voucher privatization was control 
over significant enterprises. The fund ended up owning a significant stake in 86% of its 
companies and a controlling stake in 65% of its companies (Egerer, 1995). 
In efficient Western equity markets under-priced shares are rare since share prices 
reflect all public information on future earnings of an enterprise. In contrast, in a 
privatization process there is much more potential to pick undervalued companies since 
information is scarce and costly. IPFs had a higher probability of choosing undervalued 
enterprises than individuals. Choosing cheap and undervalued shares (shares with a high· 
turnaround potential), required more information on companies than was publicly 
available, which explains the emergence ofIPFs. Since HCC had some information 
concerning the likelihood of success of enterprises, they were definitely at an advantage 
over the original voucher holders, who were operating under conditions of uncertainty 
(Sowell). 
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VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The creation of investment privatization funds can be regarded as an institutional 
arrangement that emerged in an economy of increasing uncertainty. Individuals sold their 
vouchers to these funds because they could not accurately assess the risk of alternative 
uses ofthe vouchers. They quickly took the certain price offered by IPFs and exited the 
game for good. Domestic-bank sponsored funds were an arrangement that reduced both 
the cost of monitoring and the economic risks associated with bank lending. On the other 
hand, funds established by individuals were entrepreneurial and aimed at control over 
enterprises and the potential profits from a concentration of ownership. The establishment 
of IPFs is a logical and natural development, given an information asymmetry between 
the original voucher holders and the IPFs. 
There are certain implications concerning future policy and the role of 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and . 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, who are involved with assisting 
the transition to a market economy. A lot of the activity of these institutions focuses on 
planning out privatization and financial assistance to the transitioning countries. While 
financial assistance in the forms ofloans helps, it seems that more help with establishing 
the appropriate institutional and legal framework for a successful transition would be 
useful. This is one implication that is relevant for most of the countries in transition in 
Eastern and Central Europe. 
In the words ofVaclav Klaus, the economist and politician largely responsible for 
the Czech economic transformation, "The speed... was regarded as absolutely essential" 
17 
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(Mejstrik, 1997). Looking at how voucher privatisation happened in practice, the time 
frame for conducting the two waves ofprivatisation was only 2-3 years, which indicates 
an admirably fast sale of the property. However, the negative consequences from the 
"shock therapy" approach are also obvious. Insufficient legal and financial frameworks 
for the conduct of privatisation account to a big part for the information gap created and 
thus, for the establishment ofIPFs. It has become clear by now that IPFs were a 
phenomenon which distorted the ideas and expectations of voucher privatisation. This 
could have been prevented had more time been taken in the establishment of legal and 
financial institutions. The IPF phenomenon could have been predicted had enough 
thought been given to possible scenarios of the process of voucher privatisation. This was 
not the case, and proper legislation for IPFs was not created, so they were able to function 
as limited companies for some time. Clearly, speed had its advantages but a more 
deliberate approach would have led to better outcomes. 
Even the World Bank now recognises in a number of its publications that a slower 
approach would have been a better idea. The following quote from the World Bank 
Finance and Private Sector Development Department Report illustrates this: 
Would countries that went through mass voucher schemes, with disappointing 
results, have been better offkeeping their enterprises in state hands while trying to 
accelerate economic reform and creating an institutional and legal framework to 
attract reputable concentrated investors? ... The concentration of ownership in 
many voucher privatization programs, as in the Czech Republic, owed much to 
poor capital market regulation and weak rule enforcement. But if the authorities 
had been willing and able to enforce an adequate regulatory framework, they 
probably would have been forced to accept a longer period of diffuse ownership. 
(Eggerer, 1998) 
Because privatization was conducted too fast, the IPFs had the absolute advantage 
in the process because of their size and access to information. This put Czech citizens 
18 
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wanting to invest on their own in an unfair and unprotected position. It is not surprising 
that under these conditions they opted for the certain profit of the sure price offered by 
IPFs over the uncertainty of continuing to hold their vouchers. If free market legal and 
financial institutions had been in place, individual investors would have been better 
protected and less likely to hand their vouchers over to the IPFs. 
These factors indicate a certain questionability of the social fairness of the 
process, which puts the Government and the transformation as a whole in a doubtful 
position in people's eyes. It is logical that a distrust of the Government's abilities to cope 
with the situation would occur after a phenomenon such as the IPFs. Even today many 
Czech citizens feel discouraged from investing on their own. The reason for this is the 
feeling among the population of the unfair position they were put in during voucher 
privatisation. This points towards taking specific measures to protect the individual 
investor in developing economies, and, specifically, the results of this study suggest 
making the necessary information available to individual investors. When insiders and 
institutions have a definite information advantage individual investors are discouraged. 
Useful areas for future research would be the institutional and legal arrangements 
that need to take place before rapid privatization in order to prevent the resulting 
concentration of ownership and control. The appropriate role of international institution 
in the economic transition should also be explored. 
19 
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ApendixA
 
Description of the Voucher Privatization Process
 
The companies, or parts of them, that were to be privatised by the voucher 
method, were transferred into private ownership according to the following procedure. 
Round '0' (1991 - 1992): Investment coupons are distributed, i.e. each citizen can 
buy a book ofvouchers with 1000 investment points. The books cost 1000 CZK, 
which is about one fifth ofthe average monthly wage in the Czech Republic. This 
fee covers only administrative costs and the costs ofthe networking system used 
during the bidding process. The voucher book has no nominal value. 
In addition, in this round the holders of investment coupons can transfer 
investment points to Investment Privatization Funds in return for cash. 
Investment Privatization Funds were established in the preparatory round of 
voucher privatization as limited companies organised mainly by banks, insurance 
companies, consultant finns and other private companies and people. The only 
condition for their establishment was possession of equity capital in the amount of 
1 million or more CZK, since separate legislation for them was not available and 
they registered as limited responsibility companies. They functioned as issuers of 
shares of stock against the reception of investment vouchers and subsequently 
used these vouchers to purchase shares in SOE'S4. 
Round 10992-1993): The prices of shares of all companies are unifonn and 
detennined by the price setting agency. In the first wave the price was 100 
4 For more information on the establishment ofIPFs see http://www.cerge.cuni.czlcerge­
ei/publicat/Books/book97.htm, Center of Economic Research at Charles University, 1997 
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investment points for 3 shares and in the second wave - 100 investment points for 
2 shares. Each share represented the same book value, which was around 1200 
KCS for both waves. 
Round 2 (1993): There are several possible developments depending on the 
supply-demand ratio for shares of each company. 
a) If the demand and supply are equal, all orders from round 1 are met fully and 
the voucher privatization of the company stops, since there are no more shares to 
be sold. 
b) Ifthe supply for shares is bigger than the demand for them in the first wave, 
existing orders are met fully. The remaining shares ofthe company are offered in 
the third round at a lower price. 
c) If the supply of shares is smaller than the demand and the difference between 
the supplied amount of shares and the demanded amount of shares is less than 
25% of the amount supplied, all orders are met in lower amounts. The voucher 
privatization ofthe company has finished since there are no unsold shares. 
d) If the supply of shares is smaller than the demand and the difference between 
the supplied amount of shares and the demanded amount of shares is more than 
25% of the amount supplied, none of the orders are met. All available shares of 
the company are offered in the next round ofprivatization at a higher price. 
The rounds continue until all available shares from participating companies have 
been sold. 
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-A review of the process of Czech voucher privatization is also provided by Jan 
Hanousek and Randall K. Filer (Hanousek, 1999). 
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